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Introduction 
 
Many people think about growth theory as complicated mathematics. Others identify it with 
enormous amounts of numbers. And it is true; growth theory is about both of these things. 
And more. First and foremost, I will argue, growth theory is about vision. It is concerned with 
questions such as: Where are we heading, and why?  What are the options? Which actions are 
needed to arrive at the preferred state? Thus, growth theory is by its very nature deeply 
political.  
This became abundantly clear with the very advent of growth theory centuries ago, when 
writers such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo tried to convince people that stagnant growth 
and generally poor living conditions were not at all necessary, if only institutions and policies 
were geared towards allowing the capitalist machine to work at full speed.  They argued 
forcefully that such changes in institutions and policies, although detrimental to the narrow 
interests of some stakeholders in the existing system, would be enormously beneficial to 
society as a whole. This “free market” optimism has been a central ingredient in many 
economists basic beliefs ever since. 
Not all writers on growth were equally cheerful about the long run outcome of “free 
market” capitalism. For instance, writers such as Thomas Malthus and Karl Marx both held 
that an unregulated capitalist market system was deemed to stagnation, crises and – possibly -
collapse, though for different reasons. Although mainstream (orthodox) economists generally 
rejected such ideas as faulty, economic developments in the first parts of this century actually 
seemed to confirm the crises-ridden character of capitalism. The view that capitalist growth if 
left to itself was not sustainable gained credibility as the crisis deepened and unemployment 
soared. The most central advocate of this view in the 1930s was of course John Maynard 
Keynes, emphasizing the importance of demand and the essential role of the government in  
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managing the economy.  His analysis – which was largely confined to the short run – was 
extended to the long run by among others Evsey Domar and Roy Harrod (so-called “post-
Keynesian growth theory”).
ii These theories showed that long run growth with full 
employment was indeed possible but depended on extensive intervention by the government 
(especially with respect to income distribution). By the end of the Second World War the 
Keynesian view of the need for an active government had become widely shared among 
policy-makers and stakeholders in the Western world. 
 
The 1950s and the return of orthodoxy 
 
The Keynesian dominance in growth theory should not last long. There were several reasons 
for this. First, the conclusions of the Keynesian and post-Keynesian theories were in conflict 
with what economists had been taught to believe since the days of Adam Smith, i.e., that 
capitalism is a self regulating system that performs best when interference in markets is at a 
minimum.  For many economists acceptance of this belief was (and in many quarters still is) 
the most important criterion for being an accepted member of the profession. Second, the 
times were changing. The 1930s had witnessed depression and unemployment. Now, in the 
1950s, the economies of the West were running at full speed. Rather than economic misery 
the real threat to Western societies now was generally conceived to be the expansion of the 
state-led systems in Eastern Europe and Asia (the Soviet Union in particular). An economic 
theory that advocated extensive state intervention in the economy must have looked very odd 
from such a perspective. 
  Whatever the reason, several orthodox economists started to search for a new growth 
theory. The so-called neo-classical growth theory developed by Robert Solow and others in 
the 1950s proposed that long-run growth with full employment was indeed possible as long as  
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market forces were allowed to operate freely. However, the strong assumptions behind this 
conclusion were severe. The theory rested on the idea of so-called “perfect competition”, i.e., 
an economy with many competing firms, each of them too small to have a real impact on the 
market. In this idealized economy, economies of scale was ruled out by assumption, since this 
was believed to imply that large firms would have lower unit costs than smaller firms and, 
hence, would be able to drive the latter out of the market. Thus, constant returns to scale were 
imposed, i.e., that a 1 % increase in all inputs yields exactly 1 % growth in output. 
Technology was regarded as an exogenous force, a so called  “public good”, freely available 
to everyone free of charge. Thus, investments by firms in development of new technology 
were also ruled out, since such investment would carry no particular financial reward for the 
firm that undertook it. 
  In such an economy the only way for a firm or country to increase its productivity 
relative to its competitors would be to mechanize, i.e., increase the amount of capital per 
worker. But neoclassical economists also assumed that the rewards to such substitution of 
capital for labor gradually diminish as the amount of capital that each worker is set to operate 
increases. For a given level of technology this implies there exists a limit beyond which 
accumulation of capital per worker will not be profitable. When an economy has reached this 
limit, the amount of capital per worker has reached its “steady state” (equilibrium), and labor 
productivity will be constant (in the absence of exogenous technological change). Or, to put it 
differently, from this perspective the only source of long run productivity growth is 
exogenous technological advance.  
As long as we accept these assumptions, this theory leads to an important prediction when 
applied to the global economy. Countries that differ in terms of initial productivity levels but 
not otherwise will converge towards the same level of productivity and the same rate of 
productivity growth. If countries differ also in other respects, such as the growth of population  
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and the propensity to save, convergence towards the same growth of productivity will still be 
achieved, but long run productivity levels will differ. In the literature the latter is often called 
“conditional convergence”. 
Hence, the neoclassical growth theory developed by Robert Solow and other in the 1950s 
implied a liberal and optimistic view on the prospects for global economic development. As 
long as market forces were allowed to operate freely, and other conditioning factors did not 




Although highly abstract, and based very strong the assumptions, at the time he neoclassical 
theory of growth was welcomed by empirical growth analysts who felt that it might give 
theoretical backing to their attempts to calculate the contribution of factor accumulation (labor 
and capital) to growth of GDP and productivity. This was so because, following to the theory, 
the prices of labor of capital  (i.e., wages and profits) will reflect the contribution from of one 
additional unit of labor and capital, respectively, to GDP. Hence, in this case, one might 
actually use observed data on wages and profits to calculate the contribution from increased 
use of labor and capital to growth of GDP. This practice came to be known as “growth 
accounting”.
iii  In the 1950s, it was applied to historical data for the USA by Moses 
Abramovitz and others, and in the 1960s and later to selected OECD countries by Edward 
Denison. Over the years this methodology has also been applied to many individual countries.  
In theory, in the absence of exogenous technological progress, the contributions from 
growth of labor and capital calculated in this way should add up to actual growth. If there is 
more growth than what can be accounted for by rising capital expenditure and more labor, the 
logic of the theory suggests that this should be seen as the contribution from exogenous  
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technological progress. But it may of course also reflect other factors not taken into account 
by the theory. In practice, the first exercises carried out in this area showed that only a small 
part of actual growth could be attributed to growth of labor and capital, up to 80 % remained 
unexplained.  
That the lion’s share of actual growth had to be explained by exogenous technological 
progress and other unidentified sources was something many were not willing to accept right 
away. Various remedies were invented to improve on this rather embarrassing result. The first 
was to adjust the factors themselves by taking into account the changes in quality and 
composition. For instance, new vintages of capital, embodying the most recent technologies, 
were assumed to be more efficient than previous ones. To some extent this practice boiled 
down to no more than building the unexplained part of actual growth (exogenous 
technological progress etc.)  into the factors themselves.  As for labor, its quality was assumed 
to increase with increases in the educational level, the economic effect of which was normally 
calculated by observing the wage gaps between labor with different educational levels. 
Second, it was suggested to take into account additional factors such as economies of scale, 
investments in R&D, possible differences in productivity levels across countries and sectors 
and a host of other factors (crime, for instance). When these additional factors were taken into 
account the growth accountants were able to explain a much larger part of actual growth. 
There was only one problem, that the very existence of some of these additional factors 
actually contradicts the assumption of the theory on which the analysis was based. For 
instance, as shown previously, the theory explicitly assumes no economies of scale. Thus, if 
such additional factors are relevant, and the available evidence suggests that they are, what 
you need is a new theory! 
In fact, Richard Nelson pointed the limitations of growth accounting out long ago.
iv  
Growth accounting, he argued, is not a tested theory on growth, it is an analysis  - or  
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description - of a growth process based on certain assumptions, the validity of which have 
generally not been proven (or tested). Often – we may add - these assumptions even defy 
common sense. It is important to remember this when assessing applications of this 
methodology.  Consider, for instance, Alwyn Young’s work on the East Asian NICs,
v where 
he claims that accumulation of capital and labor explains everything there is to about why 
these economies grew so rapidly. To assess this claim you have to find out whether the 
underlying assumptions, on which this conclusion is based, really hold. That means that you 
have to ask the following type of questions: Did perfect competition prevail? Were there no 
large firms with market power? No scale economics? Was technology freely available to 
everyone free of charge? Without answers to this these deeper questions growth accounting 
exercises cannot be used to draw conclusions about what drives growth. As pointed out by 
Robert Lucas,
vi commenting on Young’s findings, just observing the fact that input and output 
growth tends to go hand in hand explains nothing.  Arguably, any theory of growth would be 
consistent with that! 
With hindsight, the empiricists’ attempt to base their work on the neoclassical (Solowian) 
theory of economic growth was less successful than initially conceived. What the empiricists 
failed to recognize, perhaps, was that the theory was not all geared towards the real world, but 
towards a totally artificial world (“perfect competition”), in which many of the growth 
inducing factors in the real economy had been eliminated by assumption. For the theoreticians 
this did the trick, since in this way were able to demonstrate that full employment was 
consistent with a market-oriented system of regulation. They did so at a high cost, however, 
because in contrast to the already existing post-Keynesian models of economic growth, the 
neoclassical model was unable to explain how the economy generates long run growth in 
GDP per capita. In fact, the only type of growth that the model could explain was transitional 
in character (on the path towards long run equilibrium), and associated with substitution of  
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capital for labor. In the long run this type of growth was bound to cease.  Any remaining 
growth of productivity would have to be classified as exogenous to the economic system.  
Economists often used the notion “manna from heaven” for such growth, which shows most 




I have used much space to explain how modern (neo-classical) growth theory (and its 
empirical applications) developed from the 1950s onwards. The justification for this is that it 
was so influential and dominated many peoples’ thinking about growth for a long time. 
Indeed this perspective is still with us, although more controversial than it used to be. This is 
not to say that the post-Keynesian and neoclassical views were the only ideas about growth 
around at the time. For instance, alternatives to the neo-classical interpretations of events had 
for a long time been advocated by a diverse group of historically oriented economists and 
economically oriented historians.  In lack of a better word I will classify these as 
“evolutionaries”.
vii I have chosen this wording to signal the importance that these people 
attached to the study of economic evolution in historical time and the drivers behind this 
process, particularly technological change which to a large extent was considered as 
endogenous.
viii  
The central contributor here was no doubt the Austrian-American economist Joseph 
Schumpeter. In contrast to the traditional emphasis in economics on capital accumulation, 
Schumpeter focused on innovation activities in firms as the driving force behind economic 
growth.
ix Essentially, he sees innovations as “new combinations” of existing pieces of 
knowledge, whether drawn from science, engineering, market research, organizational 
experience or other sources, but with a view to commercial application. His concept of  
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innovation is broad and goes beyond the mere invention of a new product or process.  
Successful innovating firms are assumed to benefit economically due to the temporary 
monopoly they get on the innovations they make. However, eventually the knowledge 
embodied in new innovations will diffuse to other firms and industries, and this will fuel 
growth further.  
While Schumpeter particularly emphasized on deliberate innovation activities by firms, 
other writers in this tradition such as, for instance, Nicholas Kaldor
x, Bengt Åke Lundvall
xi 
and Nathan Rosenberg
xii have focused on the importance of learning as the source of 
technological progress and growth. Such learning occurs because people in their daily life, 
particularly at work, experience problems and – upon reflection – come up with new and 
improved solutions that increase productivity.  It may originate in production, through 
investments and the subsequent application of new machinery, as the result of interaction with 
customers or suppliers or through organized links with other firms or organizations. Learning 
may also give rise to organized R&D of the type emphasized by Schumpeter, to some extent 
blurring the traditional distinction between innovation and diffusion of technology. Hence, in 
this literature, learning is increasingly analyzed as an interactive process, with feedback to and 
from organized R&D whether in the private or public sector. This has recently led researchers 
in this area to view a country’s innovation and learning performance from a system 
perspective, focusing not only on the various institutions and organizations that take part in 
innovation and learning, but also on their mutual interaction. The concept “national system of 
innovation”, used in several recent studies, reflects this perspective.
xiii 
The economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron pioneered the study of the international 
aspects of this process of innovation and learning. Some countries are at the technological 
frontier, while others lag behind. Although the technological gap between a frontier country 
and a laggard represents as “a great promise” for the latter (a potential for high growth  
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through imitating frontier technologies); there are also various problems that may prevent 
backward countries from reaping the potential benefits to the full extent. Gerschenkron argued 
that if one country succeeds in embarking on an innovation-driven growth path others might 
find it increasingly difficult to catch up. His favorite example was Germany’s attempt to catch 
up with Britain on century ago. When Britain industrialized, technology was relatively labor 
intensive and small scale. But in the course of time technology became much more capital and 
scale intensive, so when Germany entered the scene, the conditions for entry had changed 
considerably. Because this, Gerschenkron argued, Germany had to develop new institutional 
instruments for overcoming these obstacles, above all in the financial sector, “instruments for 
which there was little or no counterpart in an established industrial country”.
xiv He held these 
experiences to be valid also for other technologically lagging countries.  
Moses Abramovitz,
xv arguing along similar lines, has used the concepts “technological 
congruence” and “social capability” to characterize the situation for latecomers. The first 
concept refers to the degree to which leader and follower country characteristics are congruent 
in areas such as market size, factor supply etc. The second points to the various efforts and 
capabilities that backward countries have to develop in order to catch up, such as improving 
education, infrastructure and, more generally, technological capabilities (R&D facilities etc.). 
He explains the successful catch up of Western Europe vis a vis the USA in the post-war 
period as the result of both increasing technological congruence and improved social 
capabilities. As an example of the former he mentions how European economic integration 
led to the creation of larger and more homogenous markets in Europe, facilitating the transfer 
of scale-intensive technologies initially developed for US conditions. Regarding the latter, he 
points among other things to such factors as the general increases in educational levels and the 
rise in the share of resources devoted to public and private sector R&D. In a similar vein the 
failure of many so-called developing countries to exploit the same opportunities is commonly  
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explained with reference to lack of technological congruence and missing social capabilities 
(f.i. education). 
In a sense these alternative contributions paint a much bleaker picture of the prospects for 
catch-up than the traditional neoclassical theory discussed earlier. Catch-up is not something 
that can be expected to occur only by market forces left alone, but requires a lot of effort and 
institution-building on the part of the backward country. One main reason for this is no doubt 
that technology is generally viewed rather differently than in the standard neoclassical 
approach. Rather than something that exists in the public domain and can be exploited by 
anybody everywhere free of charge (the public good assumption), technological competence, 
whether created through learning or organized R&D, is commonly seen as deeply rooted in 
the specific capabilities of private firms and their networks/environments (including in many 
cases parts of the public sector). 
 
The convergence controversy 
 
For a long time empirical work on economic growth was dominated by measurement 
(attempts to measure productivity in different countries, sectors and industries) and growth-
accounting exercises. However, as the empirical research agenda shifted from description 
towards explanation (of differences in growth between countries), researchers in this area 
started to supplement this descriptive work with econometric techniques (multivariate 
regression) to cross-country data sets with the purpose of distinguishing between the potential 
for catch-up and the various factors that determine to what extent this potential is actually 
exploited.
xvi The potential for catch up was normally measured by the distance in productivity 
(or GDP per capita) between the country in question and the economically leading country of 
the sample (normally the United States). Other variables that were taken into account included  
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differences across countries in rates of investment, educational attainment, R&D/innovation 
performance,
 openness to trade, size of government etc.  
Initially most studies were confined to the developed market economies for which data 
were most easily forthcoming (the OECD countries). It was shown that among these 
countries, a process of catching up had taken place from the 1950s onwards, i.e., that the 
initially poorest countries in the area had grown much faster per capita than the economically 
leading country (the United States). Moreover, the differences in GDP per capita had steadily 
been reduced between the OECD countries, suggesting a tendency towards convergence 
towards a common level of GDP per capita for the area as a whole. It was also shown that 
these tendencies towards catch-up and convergence were much stronger when other 
conditioning variables were taken into account, indicating that the potential for catch-
up/convergence was larger than what was actually realized. Many variables were found to 
contribute to this process, including – notably – investment, education and R&D/innovation 
performance.
 xvii 
  Although several of these studies were inspired by evolutionary views on technology 
and catching-up, the results could also be interpreted as supportive of the basic orthodox 
belief in the efficiency of markets, since convergence to a common level of productivity was 
indeed found to take place. However, this evidence turned out to be more controversial than 
initially conceived. For instance, it was pointed out by Bradford DeLong
xviii in a paper from 
1988 that the sample of OECD countries might be biased, since it consisted mainly of the 
countries in the global economy that had done reasonably well after the end of the second 
world war. He also presented some preliminary evidence suggesting that a similar tendency 
towards convergence could not be established for a more balanced sample. This pointed to the 
need for larger samples than just the countries of the OECD area, something that was made 
possible by the construction of new and larger data sets that were made available towards the  
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end of the 1980s.
xix Inspired by the work by Abramovitz and others on technology gaps and 
growth William Baumol and others
xx applied regression models of the type just discussed to 
cross-country samples including up to 100 countries or more. The conclusion of this work was 
that while a tendency towards convergence could perhaps be established for the OECD 
countries in the post war period, and may be extending to some other countries as well, it does 
not hold for the world as a whole. In fact, many poor countries fail more or less completely to 
exploit the potential for catch-up, something that obviously does not go on well with the 
predictions of the traditional neoclassical theory. But the new evidence confirmed the 
previous finding of a considerable potential for catch-up by poorer countries, which, however, 
is not fully exploited due to lack of “social capability” and other factors (so-called 
“conditional convergence”). 
  Hence, the evidence pointed towards a quite complex picture, with groups of countries 
with certain common characteristics doing rather differently. One interpretation of this 
evidence was that rather than global convergence what could be observed was a multitude of 
different  “convergence clubs”.
xxi How should this be explained? Would it be possible to 
explain this diversity within a common theoretical framework, though necessarily more 
complex than the one that had dominated up to this point (that of Robert Solow)?  This was 
the challenge confronting growth theorists towards the end of the 1980s. 
 
The new orthodox theory 
 
The problems that traditional neoclassical growth theory and empirical applications faced in 
explaining the observed patterns of long run growth in the world economy, and the emergence 
of other, competing approaches, led eventually to a search among neoclassical theorists for 
new models of growth.  What they wanted was a formal model that continued to be based on  
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the orthodox vision of the economy as a set of rational, maximizing agents (endowed with 
perfect information and foresight) interacting with one another but which yielded predictions 
that were consistent with what could actually be observed.  
The central contributor here has been Paul Romer. There were in particular two 
aspects of the old neoclassical theory of economic growth that he wanted to improve on. First, 
he wanted a theory (or “model”) that could explain long run growth without having to rely on 
the assumption of exogenous technological progress.  Hence, he wished to endogenize 
technological progress. For this reason the theories that he helped to create are sometimes 
called “endogenous growth theories” (in contrast to the old neoclassical theory in which long 
run productivity growth had to be explained by exogenous factors).  These theories are also 
sometimes dubbed “new growth” theories which is, of course, not very informative and – as 
times go by - not very accurate either. Second, he wanted this model to yield predictions that 
were consistent with the diversity of growth patterns that empirical research had found to 
exist, in particular the fact the poor countries did not catch up with the rich ones, but 
continued to stay poor (at least in relative terms).  
In so doing he encountered the problem that we have already discussed at some length, 
namely that within the usual neoclassical framework, in the absence of exogenous 
technological progress, the assumptions of (a) positive, but decreasing returns to substitution 
of one factor (say, labor) by another one (say, capital)  and (b) constant returns to a 
simultaneous increase in all factors, lead to a situation in which there is no incentive to further 
accumulation of capital per worker and, hence, no productivity growth. To avoid this outcome 
you have to allow for economies of scale in (i.e., increasing returns to scale) one way or 
another, so that accumulation can go on in spite of decreasing returns to factor substitution. 
This was of course not an entirely new idea, it had for instance been suggested by Nicholas 
Kaldor already in the 1950s. The reason why orthodox theorists avoided it for so long was  
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probably that it was believed to be in conflict with their vision of a self-regulating market, 
since under such conditions, large firms would be more efficient than smaller ones, which, in 
the long run, might lead to some kind of monopoly. In such a situation, neoclassical theory 
would actually justify extensive intervention in the economy by the government, in contrast to 
what economists generally held to be the preferred economic policy stance.   
However, Paul Romer showed that it was an easy way out of this, and that was to assume 
increasing returns to scale at the level of the country, and constant returns at the level of the 
firm, so that firms continue to operate as they were living within a world characterized by 
“perfect competition”.
xxii The idea was the simple one  - suggested by among others Kenneth 
Arrow and Nicholas Kaldor two decades earlier - that the use of new forms of capital 
equipment leads to learning that may help improving new generations of machinery. The 
beneficiaries of this learning will be the users of these new generations of capital equipment. 
The firm(s) in which such learning occurs will also benefit, but not more than other users of 
this equipment. Hence, the learning process will leave the relative competitive position of 
firms unchanged, and will - therefore - not induce changes in  their behavior vis a vis each 
other.  
At the macro level, however, the consequences are different form those of the traditional 
Solow model. As pointed out, although learning cannot be appropriated by any single firm, all 
firms in a country are assumed to benefit collectively from it, in the forms of new and more 
productive machinery. The ever-increasing productivity of new generations of capital, caused 
by learning, checks the tendency towards decreasing returns to capital accumulation that 
would otherwise have led productivity growth so slow down and eventually - in the absence 
of exogenous technological progress - to cease altogether. Hence, because of learning, the 
capitalists will continue to find it profitable to invest in new machines. As a consequence 
growth will be sustained into the long run. This also implies that the forces that in the  
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traditional Solow model were assumed to lead to convergence between rich and poor 
countries are no longer operative, because there is not any longer an inherent tendency for 
capital accumulation to slow down as the amount of capital per worker increases. Hence, rich 
countries may grow as fast as the poor ones, consistent with the apparent lack of convergence 
in the global economy.  
To some extent this model did the trick, but it had a major disadvantage, it did not allow 
for technological progress to be caused by organized R&D within firms. Obviously, in a 
world with no unique benefits accruing to firms that invest in R&D, such as in the model 
discussed above, there will be no R&D either. To allow for technological progress to be 
caused by R&D, firms investing in R&D must – at least on average – receive an adequate 
return on these investments (as empirical research indeed suggests
xxiii). But what is the 
economic mechanism generating such returns? The lion’s share of the R&D investments are 
typically made early in the life of a product, often before it enters the market, and – in the case 
of success – paid back over the products life-time by keeping prices well above production 
cost. This, however, implies that the innovating firms have sufficient market power to keep 
prices at that level, in contrast to what is assumed to be the case in “perfect competition”. 
Joseph Schumpeter, as we may recall, had explained this as the result of the temporary 
monopoly that innovating firms get on the innovations they make, which might be related to 
legal forms of protection (patents etc.), but also – and perhaps more commonly - to the fact 
that imitation in many cases is difficult, time-consuming and costly (because the total pool of 
knowledge and other assets necessary to produce and commercialize an innovation may not 
be very transparent or easily available on the market). 
Basing himself partly on these ideas, Paul Romer suggested in later work an alternative 
theory, partly based on Schumpeterian ideas, in which both economies of scale and imperfect 
competition are assumed.
xxiv In contrast to the previous model, in which technological  
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progress was considered as a pure externality, like “manna from heaven”, this new approach 
models innovation as the outcome of deliberate efforts by firms which have sufficient market 
power to prevent the immediate and cost-less diffusion of their innovations to other firms and 
countries. However, Romper points out, every investment in R&D has to aspects, one specific 
related to a new product and process, that may be protected by patents, trade marks, secrecy 
or other means, and one general that contributes to the advance of scientific and technological 
knowledge in society as a whole, and which improves the capability to produce new 
innovations in the future. In this sense every new innovations stand on the shoulders of all 
previous ones. It is this continuous improvement in our capability to innovate that in this 
perspective prevents the decreasing returns to investments in innovative activity that would 
otherwise have set in.  
Thus, in this second approach, long run economic growth is explained through the 
interplay of imperfect competition, which is necessary for R&D to take place, and spillovers 
(i.e., externalities) from these R&D investments on the general level knowledge in society 
and, hence, on the our capability to produce innovations in the future.  The main difference 
between this framework and the previous one is that in this case it is the resources devoted to 
R&D  - and the factors that influence the allocation of resources to this purpose - that 
determine economic growth, not capital accumulation in the traditional sense. Hence, from 
this perspective, the failure of many poor countries to catch up with the richer ones would 
among other things have to be explained by lack of resources devoted R&D (rather than 
physical capital).  
These new theories do have interesting implication for policy. In the old framework, where 
productivity growth in the long run depended only on exogenous technological progress, 
policy by definition could not have a long-run impact. In these new models this is not longer 
so. Policies that impact on the propensities to invest in physical capital (the first type of  
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model) or R&D/innovation (the second one) may raise growth permanently. Hence, as 
pointed put by Robert Lucas, from this perspective it is quite easy to conceive situations in 
which interventions by the government in the economy might have a significant, positive 
effects for the long-run performance of an economy.
xxv However, it is difficult within such a 
framework to draw very firm conclusions on the use of specific policy instruments, since the 
appropriateness of these will depend on the characteristics of the country in question (country 
size, industrial structure, skill-composition of labor force etc.) and its relations with the global 
economy.
xxvi For instance, one of the more controversial predictions from these theories is 
that large countries tend to benefit more from spillovers than others, and therefore is likely to 
grow faster. Moreover, if there is one economic activity characterized by extensive spillovers 
between firms (say, R&D-intensive industry) and another that is not (say, traditional industry) 
the theory suggests that large countries tend to specialize in the former and small countries in 
the latter. If true, and not only an artifact caused by, for instance, simplifications used in 
formal modeling, this implies that countries of different sizes may find themselves in quite 




These theoretical advances led to a surge of empirical work. As the new theory differs from 
the old one in important respects one might perhaps have expected that a new type of 
empirical work would have developed, focusing on new issues, using new data and applying 
new methods. This, however, has generally not been the case, or at least not until very 
recently.  
What most applied researchers in this area have done is to follow the tradition from 
Cornwall, Baumol and others, i.e., applying regression models to cross-country data sets.  
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Ross Levine and David Renelt have summarized much of this work.  What they did was to 
test the various factors that have been emphasized in the empirical literature in a systematic 
way in order to establish how robust the findings are for inclusion of other possible 
explanatory variables.
xxvii This, it may be noted, is not a test of causality, important 
relationships may well be found to be fragile following this methodology. The principal 
finding of Levine and Renelt was that the most robust relationship is between growth and 
investment. Some support was also found for variables reflecting the scope for catch-up 
(proxied by GDP per capita gaps) and educational efforts. All other explanatory variables 
were found to be fragile, including a large number of policy variables, openness (defined in 
different ways) and political factors (such as democracy, stability etc.). 
xxviii 
What is there to learn from this new generation of empirical research? Not very much I 
will argue. That investment is correlated with growth should come as no surprise. Indeed, this 
is something that would be consistent with most theories in this area, including those that 
consider investment as endogenous to the growth process, as some available evidence on time 
series data seems to suggest.
xxix It is also worth noticing that the studies by Levine and others 
fail to include R&D and innovation, and thus throw little light on the mechanisms highlighted 
by the most recent generation of growth theories.  However, the results from the empirical 
literature are useful in the sense that they urge us to use some caution when assessing the 
impact of policy on growth.  
This lesson is especially relevant for those who believe that a so-called “correct” set of 
macro policies in combination with trade liberalization and deregulation is enough to foster 
development and growth, as argued, for instance, by the World Bank.
xxx In fact, as pointed out 
above, there is very little scholarly support for such an interpretation of events. On the 
contrary it is clear that the governments in the most successful “catching-up” countries in the 
post-war period have all intervened extensively in the markets through various types of pro- 
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active policies.
 xxxi Although the chosen policy set may have differed from one country to 
another, they have by and large performed the same function; to increase the share of national 
resources devoted to growth, and to steer these resources to the technologically most 
progressive parts of the economy. This is a recipe for high growth that would be consistent 
with several versions in the most recent generation of growth theory. The World Bank has 
nevertheless tried to argue that spectacular growth of these countries in the post war period 
these policies is not related to these policies, but as shown by several studies, these arguments 
do not sustain detailed scrutiny.
 xxxii  
Another relevant strand of research attempts to measure private and social returns to R&D 
and innovation. This type work has gone on for a long time, independently of the 
developments in growth theory, but attracts a growing interest due to the recent changes in 
formal theorizing. Generally, these empirical exercises
xxxiii tend to find high private returns to 
investments in R&D, about twice as high as for other types of investment. This, of course, 
runs counter to traditional neoclassical perspectives on investment, according to which returns 
to different types of investments should be equalized. Hence, one of the central issues in this 
area, which we will not venture into here, has been how these high private returns can be 
explained. However, high as these private returns may be, social returns are commonly found 
to be even higher, indicating important positive spillovers from R&D, especially when 
conducted in private firms. These findings suggest that from a social point of view, substantial 
underinvestment in (private sector) R&D is taking place, and that is an area where 
governmental intervention might be justified. These are, of course, results that concur very 
well with much recent theorizing in this area. 
 Recently, there have been some attempts to address these issues from a perspective that 
draws more explicitly on the advances in the growth literature. Central questions in this more 
recent literature are (a) to what extent the spread of new technology from the innovator to  
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other firms, i.e., technology diffusion, is influenced by geographical, institutional and cultural 
boundaries, (b) whether country size matters for the degree of success in innovation (as 
suggested by some recent theorizing) and (c) what the most efficient carriers of technology 
diffusion are. Arguably, new technology may diffuse in many different ways; embodied in 
goods or services that make use new technology, through foreign direct investments by 
multinational firms or by imitative activities by domestic firms, drawing on a multitude of 
sources, as well as (necessary) complementary assets/capabilities. There is some theoretical 
backing for all of these but there has until recently been little if any evidence on their relative 
importance. 
Although research in this area is still in early stage, the available evidence seems to 
indicate that diffusion of technology (knowledge spillovers) is hampered by distance and is 
generally easier and quicker within than across country borders.
xxxiv There is also some 
evidence suggesting that returns to R&D investment are higher in large countries, consistent 
with some of the suggestions from recent advances in growth theory.
xxxv On the last question, 
which carrier of technology is the most efficient, there is not much evidence yet. Some recent 
exercises point to R&D embodied in imports of goods and services as a very efficient way of 
transmitting new technology.
xxxvi  However, others, using essentially the same type of 
indicator, fail to reproduce these results, so the conclusion has to be that on this issue there is 
no firm evidence yet.
xxxvii Finally, several recent studies indicate that there exist persistent 
differences across countries in their capacity to absorb foreign technology (education, 
infrastructure, technological capabilities etc.), and that this is a very important – probably the 
most important - factor explaining differences in growth and welfare across countries.
xxxviii 
  Thus, the picture that emanates from this research is on which innovation and 
diffusion of technology plays an essential part for growth, and where diffusion, contrary to the 
assumption in the public good approach, is a difficult and costly process that requires a lot of  
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effort not only by the firms themselves, but also by government at various levels. This is so 
because available evidence indicates that from a social point of view, there is considerable 
underinvestment in innovation of technology, and because research has shown that the 
diffusion of these innovations, which is essential for growth, depends on a number of 
capabilities that firms are unlikely to create to a sufficient extent if left to themselves. As for 
instance Joseph Stiglitz has pointed out, such coordination failure is a characteristic feature of 
industries operating under increasing returns.
  Arguably, the, at least until recently, seemingly 





What the various perspectives on growth discussed in this essay have in common is that they 
contain two basic elements, a view on what drives growth and what form of regulation 
mechanism that is necessary to allow growth to go on.   
On what drives growth, the dominant view has over the years been that growth is 
driven by accumulation of capital or “mechanization”. This was the view of the classical 
political economists, including Karl Marx, post-Keynesian growth theorists such as Sir Roy 
Harrod or Evsey Domar (or Nicholas Kaldor for that sake), and – at least until very recently – 
all neoclassical theorists, including Robert Solow and Kenneth Arrow. From a historical point 
of view it is not difficult to understand why this view emerged as the dominant one. Clearly, 
during the so-called “industrial revolution” (whether it is appropriate to use the word 
revolution or if it should rather be seen as an evolutionary process) and the period that 
followed, mechanization was a vital ingredient.   
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It is perhaps less evident why this view should dominate economists’ perceptions of 
the word for so long. In my view, it was the great achievement of Joseph Schumpeter 
(although he was not without forerunners) to break with this one-sided view and bring to the 
economists’ attention a totally different argument about what drives growth, focusing on 
qualitative (i.e., innovation) rater than quantitative change. With hindsight it was probably no 
coincidence that Schumpeter’s own professional career run parallel with the growth of science 
based industry, organized R&D and the development of various types of institutions and 
organizations relating to this process. It testifies to his qualities as an analyst of contemporary 
developments that he was able to grasp the full impact of these tendencies at such an early 
stage. In fact, it took a long time for science based industry and organized R&D to acquire the 
prominence it has today. Although pioneered in Germany at the turn of the century, it was 
only during the Second World War and the cold war that followed that these developments 
took off, and then primarily in the USA. 
While initially most writers on growth shared a common conception of what were the 
drivers, this was not case for regulation. Since the beginning, discussions of regulation have 
been dominated by adherents of two diametrically opposite positions, that of “laissez faire” 
capitalism on the hand and state planning (or very extensive intervention) on the other, and 
the upper hand in the struggle has tended to change over time. Among the classical political 
economists, who all saw the economy from the mechanization perspective, some, such as 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, were liberal free marketers, while Karl Marx believed that 
laissez faire was doomed to collapse, and had to be succeed by state planning. In the first half 
of this century, the view that a capitalist order ruled by free markets was basically unstable 
gained prominence as the crisis of the interwar period deepened, and led to the formulation of 
(the so-called post-Keynesian) growth theories advocating extensive state intervention in the 
economy. However, under the impact of the post-war boom and the cold war that followed,  
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the liberal view again got the upper hand, as reflected in the neoclassical model of economic 
growth developed by Robert Solow and others. 
The problem for this theory was not so much that it advocated free markets, which has 
been in fashion for a long time, but that it was based on an outdated understanding of what 
drives growth and how the capitalist system, including its institutions, works. It simply did 
not have any useful advice to give to people (such as policy-makers) who were concerned 
about the working of the economy. This is the reason why the works of Joseph Schumpeter 
and other economists with insights in how innovation and learning is shaped by – and shapes 
– the economy started to gain prominence again from the 1960s onwards, mainly through the 
writings of applied economists such as Christopher Freeman.
xxxix Although Schumpeter 
himself was a devoted liberal, much of the work that based itself on his ideas came to focus 
on limitations to the working of markets, particularly with respect to innovation and diffusion 
of technology, and what the government - in countries on different levels of development - 
may do to improve on the economy in this respect.  
What has happened in the area of formal theorizing in the last decade is that this 
agenda has been taken over by formal theorists.  This has led to the creation of more complex 
models, incorporating technology and innovation, that explain growth in a better way than 
before. These models are also more open in the sense that many different outcomes are 
possible, depending on what the key assumptions are, and with a much greater room for 
policy. Many of these assumptions cannot be established on a priori grounds, at least not at 
the current state of formal theorizing in this area, but need to be verified through empirical 
research. This has led to a new agenda for empirical research that is both more meaningful 
and more interesting than what we had before.  The most important contribution, I will argue, 
that empirical work can make to theoretical work is not to test assumedly “true” formal 
relationships but to raise the quality of the assumptions that theoreticians make use of.  
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  While formal modeling in this area has greatly improved in terms of how technology 
is handled, other basic neoclassical features have retained, such as for example the idea of  
“the representative agent”, i.e., that all agents in the economy are identical, rational, endowed 
with perfect information etc. This certainly runs counter to one of the most basic arguments of 
evolutionary reasoning; that agents are different (heterogeneous), that this creates diversity, 
which is what drives innovation. Hence, following this view, to explain diversity of growth 
patterns, one has to allow for heterogeneous agents, whether at the level of the individual 
entrepreneur, firm or nation state.  This is an area where more work is needed, and which 
potentially could be of great importance for formal theorizing. However, to be able to respond 
to this challenge, empirical researchers have to go beyond empirical approaches that 
essentially consist of filtering out heterogeneity.  Arguably, to get a firm grasp on 
heterogeneity, one will need more case-oriented research of the type undertaken in many 
other disciplines, as well as by the grand economic masters of the past, such as Adam Smith, 
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